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INSURANCE-SUIT LIMITATION CLAUSE-AN INSURER'S BAD FAITH Ac-
CUSATION OF CRIMINAL CONDUCT BY THE INSURED, OR AN ACCUSA-
TION WHICH IS THE RESULT OF A NEGLIGENT INVESTIGATION, CAN
TOLL THE SUIT LIMITATION CLAUSE.
Leone v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. (1979).
Plaintiff, Joseph Leone, Jr., was the assignee of a two-month binder' of
fire insurance issued by the defendant, Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.
(Aetna). 2 The binder contained a standard provision, 3 mandated by
Pennsylvania law, requiring plaintiff to initiate suit on the policy within
twelve months after a loss. 4 On May 15, 1976, while the binder was in
effect, the insured property was damaged by fire. 5 Having been duly
notified, 6 Aetna investigated the loss and denied coverage under the terms
of the policy, 7 notifying Leone that it suspected him of arson. 8 Leone de-
nied responsibility for the fire,9 but failed to bring suit on the policy for
more than a year following the incident.10 The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted Aetna's motion to dismiss 11
1. A binder is "a temporary contract, pending the issuance of a policy." R. MEHR & E.
CAMMACK, PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 153 (6th ed. 1967). A binder is necessary because, since
there is often a substantial interval between the application for and the issuance of an insurance
policy, the applicant may suffer an unprotected loss before the actual policy becomes effective.
R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 2.3 (a), at 36 (1971). In most cases, the courts "assume that the
binder conforms to standardized policy provisions." R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supra at 154.
2. 448 F. Supp. 698, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1978), rev'd sub nom. Leone v. Aetna Cas. & Sur.
Co., 599 F.2d 566, 567 (3d Cir. 1979). The binder provided coverage for damages resulting
from fire, vandalism, and/or malicious mischief. 448 F. Supp. at 699.
3. See 599 F.2d at 567.
4. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 636(2) (Purdon 1971). The statute requires, inter alia, that
the following provision be included in insurance policies: "No suit or action on this policy for
the recovery of any claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity unless all the
requirements of this policy shall have been complied with, and unless commenced within
twelve months next after inception of the loss." Id.
5. 599 F.2d at 567. The loss occured 15 days after coverage was obtained. Id.
6. Id. Under Pennsylvania law, the insured must give immediate written notice to the
insurer of any loss. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 636(2) (Purdon 1971). For a discussion of the
notice requirement, see Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977). See
also notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
7. 599 F.2d at 567.
8. Id. at 567-68. On or about October 12, 1976, Aetna informed the plaintiff that it would
continue its investigation of the claim because it had reason to believe that Leone was responsi-
ble for the loss. Id. at 568. Aetna formally denied plaintiff's claim on November 30, 1976, five
months prior to the expiration of the suit limitation period. See id. at 567.
9. Id. at 568.
10. Id. at 567.
11. 448 F. Supp. at 702. The suit was removed to the federal court as a diversity action and
Aetna moved to dismiss under rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted, claiming that the action was barred by the suit
limitation clause. Id. at 698-99. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
Plaintiff argued that, because the policy provided coverage against vandalism and malicious
mischief, the statutory requirements for standard fire polices, including the suit limitation
clause, did not apply. 448 F. Supp. at 699. Leone further contended that Aetna's failure to
formally notify him of its objections to his claim until November 30, 1976, constituted an im-
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because of Leone's failure to comply with the policy's suit limitation
clause. 12 On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Cir-
cuit 13 reversed and remanded, holding that an insurance company's bad
faith allegation of criminal conduct on the part of the insured, or an allega-
tion of such conduct resulting from a negligent investigation, can toll a suit
limitation clause.14  Leone v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 599 F.2d 566
(3d Cir. 1979).
Suit limitation clauses enable an insurer to rely on the non-assertion of a
claim after a reasonable time has passed, 15 make the insurer aware of the
extent of asserted losses, 1 6 and assure a speedy resolution of the claim.
1 7
These contractually imposed limitation periods were initially rejected by
some courts as against public policy in that they usurped the legislative func-
tion of determining statutes of limitations.' 8 Other courts, however, have,
after considering the length of the time period provided and determining
that the insurer gained no undue advantage, upheld suit limitation provi-
sions which appeared to be reasonable. 19 Many states, including Pennsyl-
plied waiver of the suit limitation provision estopping Aetna from asserting that provision as a
defense. Id. at 701.
Rejecting Leone's first argument, the district court concluded that all policies containing
fire insurance coverage are governed by Pennsylvania's statutory requirements for fire policies
set out in PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 636(2) (Purdon 1971). 448 F. Supp. at 700. The court then
rejected Leone's allegation of implied waiver, finding that the insurer's conduct was not the
cause of Leone's failure to comply with the suit limitation requirement. Id. at 702. For a discus-
sion of the doctrine of waiver of suit limitation provisions under Pennsylvania law, see note 26
infra.
12. 448 F. Supp. at 702. The district court found "no basis for the tolling of [the] limitations
clause" and granted defendant's motion to dismiss "as it [was] admitted that th[e] action was not
filed within twelve (12) months of the date on which the fire occurred." Id. at 701.
13. The case was heard by Judges Gibbons and Hunter, and by Judge Meanor of the United
States District Court for the District of New Jersey, sitting by designation. Judge Meanor wrote
the majority opinion. Judge Hunter wrote a dissenting opinion.
14. 599 F.2d at 569. The court did not reach the merits of plaintiff's claim, holding only that
Leone should be allowed the opportunity to demonstrate that Aetna's allegations of criminal
conduct were made either in bad faith or as the result of a negligently conducted investigation. Id.
15. R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK, supra note 1, at 264. Insurers rely upon a suit limitation
clause so as to efficiently manage their reserves for losses which are reported but not yet set-
tled. Id. One court has concluded that the purposes of a suit limitation clause in a policy are to
allow insurers to cut off claims at a certain time and to reduce uncertainty as to the insurer's
liability. Brandywine One Hundred Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 405 F. Supp. 147, 151 (D.
Del. 1975), aff'd mer., 588 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978).
16. Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386, 390 (1870).
17. Id. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that it "is clearly for the interest of insurance
companies that the extent of losses sustained by them should be speedily ascertained, and it is
equally for the interest of the assured that the loss should be speedily adjusted and paid." Id.
18. See, e.g., Thielbar Realities, Inc. v. National Union Fire Co., 91 Mont. 525, 9 P.2d 469
(1932) (in effect, "the parties assumed to legislate to shorten the statutory period of limitation
prescribed"); Young v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of Am., 142 Neb. 566, 7 N.W.2d
81 (1942) (although suit limitation clause was contrary to state public policy, limitation upheld
under "full faith and credit" clause); Miller v, State Ins. Co., 54 Neb. 121, 74 N.W. 416 (1898)
(contractual suit limitation period differing from statutory period of limitations is void).
19. See, e.g., Riddlesbarger v. Hartford Ins. Co., 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 386 (1870) (parties to
contract are free to shorten period in which claims may be brought); Fageol Truck & Coach Co.
v. Pacific Indem. Co., 18 Cal. 2d 731, 117 P.2d 669 (1941) (courts cannot disregard covenant
1979-1980] 1039
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 6 [1980], Art. 11
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol25/iss6/11
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 25: p. 1038
vania, 20 have statutorily adopted a standard fire insurance policy containing a
suit limitation clause.
21
Because of the adhesionary nature of insurance contracts, 22 courts tend
to protect the insured. 23  For example, courts have avoided giving a literal
construction to certain procedural policy clauses where their breach would
shortening period for bringing suit unless clause is shown to be unreasonable or the result of
imposition or undue advantage); Beeson v. Schloss, 183 Cal. 618, 192 P. 292 (1920) (contractual
provision allowing insured six months in which to institute suit is not unreasonable as a matter
of law where insured cannot show undue advantage); Tebbets v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 155 Cal.
137, 99 P. 501 (1909) (suit limitation clause valid if time limit is not unreasonable).
20. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 636(2) (Purdon 1971). Pennsylvania law requires that fire
insurance policies contain the standard provisions listed in the statute, with a few limited excep-
tions as set forth in § 636(3). Id. See id. § 636(3). The issuance of a policy without these
statutory provisions may result in the revocation of the insurer's license and/or imposition of a
fine. Id. § 637.
21. ABA SUBCOMM. ON STANDARD FIRE POLICY AND SUBCOMM, ON EXTENDED COVERAGE
ENDORSEMENT OF THE COMM. ON FIRE INSURANCE LAW, CURRENT ANNOTATIONS OF THE
1943 STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE POLICY AND EXTENDED COVERAGE ENDORSEMENT §§ 1, 22B
(1970). The need for a standardized fire policy arose due to the variations resulting from the
practice of having many different people draft policies and from the growing complexity of
insurance contracts. D. BICKELHAUPT, GENERAL INSURANCE 469-70 (9th ed. 1974). Many states
have adopted the 1943 New York Standard Fire Insurance Policy, either by legislative enact-
ment or administration regulation. R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 70. See, e.g., 20 ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1503(A) (1956); 76 IDAHO CODE § 41-2401 (1977); 17 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 36-5.20
(West 1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 636 (Purdon 1971).
Fire policies are, by their nature, susceptible to standardization and, although variations in
maintenance patterns may affect the risk of fire, standardized fire policies provide for easily
adjustable rates and standardized endorsements. R. KEETON, supra, at 70.
A standardized fire policy benefits the insured in two respects: 1) by minimizing discrepan-
cies in a policy; and 2) by obviating the necessity to compare, sentence-by-sentence, the cover-
age offered by different insurance companies. D. BICKELHAUPT, supra, at 471.
22. See R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 350. The prospective insured's input is, for example,
often limited to requesting endorsements on the form policy. Id.
Although the interests of policyholders and the general public are, in theory, represented
in the standard policies mandated by the legislature,
[o]nly the insurers have an effectively organized lobby . . .; policyholder interests and the
public interest in a sound insurance system are independently represented to a very little
extent except insofar as individual legislators and administrators take the initiative in such
representation. Thus, standardization by cooperation among insurers is effective in ad-
vancing the interests of policyholders and the public only insofar as these latter interests
are consistent with those of the insurers,
Id. at 73.
23. See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345 (Del. 1974) (because
an insurance contract is not a truly consensual agreement, it must be interpreted to accord with
the reasonable expectations of the purchaser); Cooper v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 51
N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968) (insurer has burden of persuasion to prove insured's breach of
notice provision and resulting prejudice); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d
193 (1977) (strict contractual approach is inappropriate where the result of such approach would
be a forfeiture of insured's policy rights); Pickering v. American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I.
143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971) (clause making uninsured motorist coverage unavailable when insured
makes settlement with the party liable for insured's injury without insurer's written consent
carries implied promise that such consent will not be unreasonably or arbitrarily withheld).
As noted by one commentator, "[tihere has been a very marked trend toward liberality in
the construction of polices for the benefit of the insured, and a broad general policy of protec-
tion of the insured as against the insurance companies. ... Note, The Effect of Conditions
Precedent in Insurance Policies, 44 DICE. L. REV. 77, 82 (1940). The contract law doctrine that
1040
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technically bar an insured's claim. 24  Applying theories of prejudice, 25
waiver, 26 and estoppel, 2 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has, in such
cases, considered whether the breach adversely affects the insurer's ability to
"ambiguities in contract drafting are resolved against the party responsible for its drafting" has
been invoked by the courts in regulating these adhesionary contracts. R. KEETON, supra note 1,
at 351. For a further discussion of judicial attempts to protect the insured, see notes 24-33 and
accompanying text infra.
24. See, e.g., Lindus v. Northern Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 160, 438 P.2d 311 (1968); State Farm
Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 320 A.2d 345 (Del. 1974); Cooper v. Government Employees
Ins. Co., 51 N.J. 86, 237 A.2d 870 (1968); Lusch v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 272 Or. 593, 538
P.2d 902 (1975); Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); Pickering v.
American Employers Ins. Co., 109 R.I. 143, 282 A.2d 584 (1971).
Professor Keeton has concluded that, to protect insureds, many courts will uphold "the
objectively reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries." R. KEETON, supra
note 1, at 351. Cf. Oregon Auto. Ins. Co. v. Salzberg, 85 Wash. 2d 372, 535 P.2d 816 (1975)
(insurer must demonstrate prejudice before insured's breach of cooperation clause will relieve
insurer of its obligations under the policy). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lamme, 83 Nev.
146, 425 P.2d 346 (1967) (a conditional receipt issued by the insurer creates a temporary life
insurance contract); Allen v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 44 N.J. 294, 208 A.2d 638 (1965)
(applicant's reasonable expectation of coverage will not be frustrated by a literal reading of a life
insurance binding receipt). Regarding the construction of policies containing ambiguities, see
note 23 and accompanying text supra.
25. See Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 427 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977); note 24 supra. For
a discussion of Brakeman, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
26. See Fritz v. British Am. Assur. Co., 208 Pa. 268, 57 A. 573 (1904). Waiver is "the
voluntary relinquishment of a known right." R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 343. In Fritz, the
insurer had required an appraisal of damages through arbitration proceedings which concluded,
unresolved, subsequent to the 12-month limitation period. 208 Pa. at 271, 57 A. at 574. In
allowing the insured to proceed with his claim, the court stated:
The company, having required an appraisement .. .must be regarded as having waived
its right to enforce the limitation clause until the appraisers have made an award or the
appraisement has been abandoned, unless the award has been delayed or the appraise-
ment has been abandoned by reason of the conduct of the insured.
Id. at 275, 57 A. at 576.
Although a waiver cannot be revoked simply by conduct, an insurer can reinstate the effec-
tiveness of a previously waived limitations provision as of a later date by giving notice to the
insured. See O'Connor v. Allemania Fire Ins. Co., 128 Pa. Super. Ct. 336, 194 A. 217 (1937).
In O'Connor, the insured and insurer were unable to resolve their differences after 13 months
of negotiations and the insurer then asserted that it would pay nothing. Id. at 343, 194 A. at
220. The court refused to allow the insured to bring suit more than one year after the insurer's
final refusal to pay anything, stating:
[W]here the acts or conduct of the insurance company ... [have] been such as to estop it
from strictly enforcing the limitation clause ... the clause begins to run again when the
company definitely announces its refusal to pay ... and the insured ...must bring his
or her action within a reasonable time thereafter, not exceeding twelve months.
Id. at 347, 194 A. at 221. For additional cases involving waiver, see G. COUCH, COUCH ON
INSURANCE, 2d § 75:183 (R. Anderson ed. 1968).
27. See Sudnick v. Home Friendly Ins. Co., 149 Pa. Super. Ct. 145, 27 A.2d 468 (1942).
Under the principle of estoppel, if the insurer gives the insured a reasonable basis for believing
either that the suit limitation clause will not be strictly enforced or that the period will be
extended, the insurer will be estopped from asserting the insured's noncompliance as a defense.
See id. at 151-52, 27 A.2d at 471. There must, however, be detrimental reliance by the insured.
R. KEETON, supra note 1, at 343.
At least one Pennsylvania court has noted that waiver and estoppel principles have been
invoked interchangeably in Pennsylvania. See O'Connor v. Allmania Fire Ins. Co., 128 Pa.
Super. Ct. 336, 194 A. 217 (1937). For a discussion of waiver, see note 26 supra.
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defend 2 8 and whether the insurer's conduct induced the insured's failure to
comply.2 9  In Brakeman v. Potomac Insurance Co., 30 for example, the su-
preme court considered the effect of the insured's breach in light of the pur-
pose of the contractual provision and required the insurer to demonstrate
that, because the insured had failed to give prompt notice as required under
the policy, it was unable to investigate adequately the claim or was other-
wise prejudiced. 3 1 Despite the fact that the insurer's liability was contrac-
tually conditioned upon prompt notice, 32 the court was unwilling to work
the forfeiture that would have resulted from a strict contractual approach.
33
Although specifically approving an insurer's use of suit limitation clauses
as a defense to an insured's suit on a policy, 34 Pennsylvania courts have
applied the principles of waiver and estoppel to mitigate the effects of strict
28. See Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 19 (1977). For a discussion of
Brakeman, see notes 30-33 and accompanying text infra.
29. See, e.g., General State Auth. v. Planet Ins. Co., 464 Pa. 162, 346 A.2d 265 (1975);
Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 47, 231 A.2d 740 (1967). For a discussion of these
cases, see notes 36-41 and accompanying text infra.
30. 472 Pa. 66, 371 A.2d 193 (1977). In Brakeman, the plaintiff, a victim of an automobile
accident in which the insured was involved, sought to recover under the insured's insurance
policy. Id. at 68, 371 A.2d at 194. The defendant insurance company refused to defend the suit
or to accept liability on the judgment which plaintiff had obtained because the insured had
failed to give prompt notice of the claim. Id.
31. Id. at 77, 371 A.2d at 198. Holding that the insurer must prove prejudice, the court
emphasized that the purpose of a notice provision is to protect the insurer by enabling adequate
investigation. Id. at 75, 371 A.2d at 197. As the court stated:
The function of the notice requirement is simply to prevent the insurer from being pre-
judiced, not to provide a technical escape-hatch by which to deny coverage in the absence
of prejudice .... Therefore, unless the insurer is actually prejudiced by the insured's fail-
ure to give notice immediately, the insurer cannot defeat its liability under the policy
because of the non-prejudicial failure of its insured to give immediate notice of an acci-
dent or claim as stipulated by a policy provision.
Id., quoting Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557, 599 (La. Ct. App. 1969).
32. 472 Pa. at 71, 371 A.2d at 195. The court noted that, in prior decisions, it had strictly
enforced the notice clause: "[W]e have said that the duty to give the notice as stipulated is a
condition precedent, and its breach releases the insurance company from the obligations im-
posed by the policy, regardless of whether the company suffered prejudice thereby." Id. at 70,
371 A.2d at 195, citing Meierdierck v. Miller, 394 Pa. 484, 147 A.2d 406 (1959); Jeannette Glass
Co. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 370 Pa. 409, 88 A.2d 407 (1952); Unverzagt v. Prestera, 339 Pa.
141, 13 A.2d 46 (1940); Ross v. Mayflower Drug Stores, Inc., 338 Pa. 211, 12 A.2d 569 (1940).
33. 472 Pa. at 73-74, 371 A.2d at 196-97. The court distinguished the insurance contract
from other contracts in that the terms of the policy are imposed by one party and the insured's
rights would be forfeited if all contractual provisions had to be strictly observed. Id. at 77, 371
A.2d at 198. Furthermore, the court was reluctant to allow the insurer to deny coverage for
which it had accepted premium payments. Id. at 75, 371 A.2d at 198.
34. See, e.g., General State Auth. v. Planet Ins. Co., 464 Pa. 162, 346 A.2d 265 (1975)
(failure to comply with 12-month suit limitation clause was not excused by insured's ignorance of
loss); Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 47, 231 A.2d 740 (1967) (insured failed to com-
ply with suit limitation clause when suit was brought within eight months after learning of loss
but later than twelve months after loss occurred); Selden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa.
500, 47 A.2d 687 (1946) (two-year suit limitation clause in accident insurance policy held valid);
Terpeluk v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 259, 150 A.2d 558 (1959) (contractual
suit limitation period valid in fire insurance policy with extended coverage); Ercle v. Metropoli-
tan Life Ins. Co., 155 Pa. Super. Ct. 549, 39 A.2d 293 (1944) (two-year suit limitation period
commencing from date proof of loss is filed held valid in life insurance policy); Ferguson v.
Manufacturers' Cas. Ins. Co., 129 Pa. Super. Ct. 276, 195 A. 661 (1937) (90-day suit limitation
1042
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enforcement of such provisions. 35 The use of waiver and estoppel, however,
has been limited to those instances in which the insurer is responsible for
the delay. 36  In Lardas v. Underwriters Insurance Co. 3 7 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court concluded that the insurer had not induced the insured to
refrain from bringing suit by denying liability prior to the expiration of the
suit limitation period. 38  Similarly, in enforcing the suit limitation provision
in General State Authority v. Planet Insurance Co., 39 the court held that the
insured's ignorance of the loss did not excuse its failure to bring suit within
the limitations period4 0 and indicated that a suit limitation clause is to be
provision in automobile insurance policy sustained). But cf. Thompson v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y of United States, 447 Pa. 271, 290 A.2d 422 (1972) (suit limitation clause does not bar
beneficiary's suit on life insurance policy where beneficiary did not know the policy existed).
For a discussion of cases in which suit limitation provisions were upheld, see notes 37-41 and
accompanying text infra.
35. See, e.g., Fritz v. British Am. Assur. Co., 208 Pa. 268, 57 A. 573 (1904). For a discus-
sion of Fritz, see note 26 supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found that, where neces-
sary, "injustice is avoided and adequate relief assured by resort to traditional principles of
waiver and estoppel." General State Auth. v. Planet Ins. Co., 464 Pa. 162, 168, 346 A.2d 265,
268 (1975). For a further discussion of General State, see notes 39-41 and accompanying text
infra. For a discussion of waiver and estoppel as applied by the Pennsylvania courts, see notes
26 & 27 supra.
36. See, e.g., General State Auth. v. Planet Ins. Co., 464 Pa. 162, 346 A.2d 265 (1975);
Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 47, 231 A.2d 740 (1967); Terpeluk v. Insurance Co. of
N. Am., 189 Pa. Super. Ct. 259, 150 A.2d 558 (1959). See also Selden v. Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co., 354 Pa. 500, 47 A.2d 687 (1946) (beneficiary's ignorance of the existence of policy does not
excuse failure to comply with suit limitation clause). But see Thompson v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y of United States, 447 Pa. 271, 290 A.2d 422 (1972) (beneficiary's unawareness of policy's
existence excused failure to bring suit within period of limitations). For a further discussion of
the Pennsylvania courts' use of waiver and estoppel, see notes 26 & 27 supra.
37. 426 Pa. 47, 231 A.2d 740 (1967).
38. Id. at 52, 231 A.2d at 742. Negotiations for settlement of the insured's claim were
terminated, without resolution, five and one-half months before the suit limitation period ex-
pired. Id. at 49, 231 A.2d at 741. However, the insured did not file suit until after the period
had expired. Id. at 49-50, 231 A.2d at 741. Plaintiff Lardas attempted to excuse the breach by
arguing that 1) the period for bringing suit commences when the insured learns of the loss, and
2) that the insurer had waived the requirement. Id. at 51, 231 A.2d at 741. The court rejected
Lardas' first contention, noting that an adequate period of time remained in which to bring suit
under the policy after he had learned of the loss. Id. The court also rejected Lardas' second
argument, determining that the insurer had not misled the plaintiff as to the possibility of a
settlement during negotiations nor attempted to persuade Lardas to forebear bringing suit. Id.
at 52, 231 A.2d at 742. Further, the court noted that the plaintiff had signed a non-waiver
agreement prior to the negotiations. Id.
Non-waiver provisions do not, however, necessarily preclude a finding that the insurer has,
in fact, waived its rights under the policy. One court has held that, because the insurer re-
quired all claims to be submitted to arbitration, it had, despite a non-waiver provision, waived
its right to rely on the suit limitation clause. Fritz v. British Am. Assur. Co., 208 Pa. 268,
274-75, 57 A. 573, 575-76 (1904). For a further discussion of Fritz, see note 26 supra.
39. 464 Pa. 162, 346 A.2d 265 (1975).
40. Id. at 168, 346 A.2d at 268. Almost three years after the loss, the insured brought suit
to recover for property damage sustained during a fire. Id. at 164, 346 A.2d at 267. On appeal,
plaintiff attempted to excuse its noncompliance with the suit limitation provision by alleging that
it had become aware of the loss only seven months prior to bringing suit, and that, being a
government agency, its delay was excusable. Id. at 166-67, 346 A.2d at 267-68. In rejecting the
plaintiff's argument, the court distinguished its holding in Thompson v. Equitable Life Assur.
Soc'y of United States, 447 Pa. 271, 290 A.2d 422 (1972), in which a life insurance beneficiary
1979-1980] 1043
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strictly applied except when the insurer is responsible for the delay.
4 1
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has nevertheless found that, if an
insurer breaches its duty of good faith owed to policy holders, an insured
may be released from the contractual obligations imposed by the policy de-
spite the insurer's lack of responsiblity for the delay. 42 In Diamon v. Penn
Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 43 the insurer had been instrumental in having
criminal charges brought against the insured for filing a false proof of loss
with respect to a fire damage claim. 44 The court excused the insured's fail-
ure to bring suit until after the statute of limitations for the criminal offense
charge had expired, concluding that the insurer's activities in securing crim-
inal charges had suspended the suit limitation period. 45 In an alternative
was allowed to proceed with her suit after the expiration of the statute of limitations, by noting
that Thompson concerned 1) a statutorily imposed bar to legal action rather than an agreed upon
contract term, and 2) an innocent third-party beneficiary who had been unaware of the policy
rather than a party to the contract itself. 464 Pa. at 167 n.7, 346 A.2d at 268 n.7. But see
Selden v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 354 Pa. 500, 503, 47 A.2d 687, 688 (1946) (court con-
cluded that beneficiary's ignorance of policy's existence does not excuse failure to comply with
suit limitation provision).
41. 464 Pa. at 168, 346 A.2d at 268. For a discussion of the application of the doctrines
of waiver and estoppel when the insurer is responsible for the delay, see notes 26 & 27 supra;
note 36 and accompanying text supra.
42. Diamon v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977). It
should be noted that, since Diamon is a superior court decision, it is arguably not an expression
of Pennsylvania law binding upon a federal diversity court. See Commissioner v. Estate of
Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967); note 68 infra. For a discussion of the Leone court's reliance
upon Diamon, see notes 57-67 & 72-89 and accompanying text infra.
43. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. 534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977).
44. Id. at 539, 372 A.2d at 1220. The insurer denied the plaintiff's claim, suspecting that he
had previously removed some of the articles allegedly damaged by the fire, and then had plain-
tiff arrested for filing a false proof of loss. Id. at 541-42, 372 A.2d at 1219-20. Plaintiff was
subsequently found guilty on the falsification charge. Id. Diamon then hired a bulldozer to
excavate the site of the loss, conducted a personal investigation, and found some of the disputed
items on the surface of the ground and the rest buried under the debris. Id. at 549, 372 A.2d at
1225-26. The district attorney subsequently entered a nolle prosequi. Id. at 538, 372 A.2d at
1220.
45. Id. at 541-42, 372 A.2d at 1222. Diamon contended that he waited until the five-year
statute of limitations applicable to the crime had expired before bringing suit because he feared
that the insurer would retaliate by having him reprosecuted. Id. at 538-39, 372 A.2d at 1220.
In holding for the plaintiff, the Diamon court relied upon an earlier superior court decision,
enforcing a suit limitation provision, in which the court emphasized that the insurer had only
informed the insured that it had not decided whether to pay the claim or to have him arrested
for arson. Id. at 542-43, 372 A.2d at 1222. See Abolin v. Farmers Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 100
Pa. Super. Ct. 433 (1930). The Abolin court found "nothing in this statement that was by way of
inducement to withhold bringing suit, or that evidenced any intention on the part of the com-
pany to waive the provision of the contract." 100 Pa. Super. Ct. at 436. In Diamon, however,
the court concluded that, because the insured had been arrested, there was sufficient induce-
ment to withhold suit. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 542-43, 372 A.2d at 1222. For a discussion of the
Leone court's interpretation of this aspect of Diamon, see note 59 and accompanying text infra.
The Diamon court concluded that a remand for a trial on the merits was proper, noting that
the insured had suffered a devastating material loss as well as the agony of an unfounded crimi-
nal prosecution while the insurer, which had initiated the prosecution, had failed to make any
payments on the claim even after the charges were dismissed. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 546, 372
A.2d at 1224. Relying on the Brakeman decision, the Diamon court further noted that, although
the insurer was seeking to be relieved from its contractual liabilities, it had not demonstrated
any prejudice resulting from the insured's late filing of a complaint. Id. at 547-48, 372 A.2d at
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holding, the Diamon court refused to find that an insured's breach of his
contractual duty to bring suit within one year barred a suit on the policy
where the insurer was suspected of having acted in bad faith 46 and of having
failed to exercise proper care in investigating the claim.
4 7
In support of its good faith standard, the Diamon court adopted the
reasoning of the California Supreme Court 48 in Gruenberg v. Aetna Life
Insurance Co. 49 in which the California court held that the insured's breach
1224-25, citing Brakeman v. Potomac Ins. Co., 472 Pa. 66, 73, 371 A.2d 193, 197 (1977). For a
criticial analysis of the Brakeman prejudice requirement for enforcement of suit limitation
clauses, see notes 90-91 and accompanying text infra.
46. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229. Reasoning that an insurer impliedly agrees
to do nothing to interfere with an insured's rights under the policy, the court declared that good
faith is an implied-in-fact condition of the contract and requires strict compliance. Id. at 550-52,
372 A.2d at 1225-27. According to the court, the insured's failure to comply with the suit
limitation clause does not relieve the insurer of this duty to act in good faith, since "the in-
surer's duty is unconditional and independent of the performance of [the insured's] contractual
obligations." Id. at 553, 372 A.2d at 1228, quoting Gruenberg v. Aetna Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566,
578, 510 P.2d 1032, 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480, 488 (1973). For a discussion of Gruenberg, see
notes 48-53 and accompanying text infra.
47. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229. The Diamon court concluded that the
insurer's duty to act in good faith included an implied promise to exercise reasonable care in
investigating claims. Id. at 550-51, 372 A.2d at 1226-28. A California court of appeals similarly
considered the quality of an insurer's investigation to be a factor in determining bad faith,
suggesting that those factors include:
the strength of the injured claimant's case on the issues of liability and damages; attempts
by the insurer to induce the insured to contribute to a settlement; failure of the insurer
to properly investigate the circumstances so as to ascertain the evidence against the in-
sured; the insurer's rejection of advice of its own attorney or agent; failure of the insurer
to inform the insured of a compromise offer; the amount of financial risk to which each
party is exposed in the event of a refusal to settle; the fault of the insured in inducing the
insurer's rejection of the compromise offer by misleading it as to the facts; and any other
factors tending to establish or negate bad faith on the part of the insurer.
Brown v. Guarantee Ins. Co., 155 Cal. App. 2d 679, 689, 319 P.2d 69, 75 (1957) (emphasis
added).
Emphasizing that some of the disputed items alleged to have been removed by the insured
were found on the surface of the ground, the Diamon court found that the quality of the inves-
tigation was subject to question and allowed the insured an opportunity to establish that the
insurer had not exercised proper care. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229. For a brief
summary of the accusations levelled at the insured, see id. at 549, 372 A.2d at 1226; note 44
supra. Just as in the case of the good faith requirement, thus it would appear that the insurer
loses its right to assert the insured's breach of contract when that breach is caused by the
insurer's failure to properly investigate the claim. See 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at
1229.
48. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 553-54, 372 A.2d at 1228.
49. 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr. 480 (1973). In Guenberg, the insurer had
caused criminal charges of arson and defrauding an insurer to be brought against the insured.
Id. at 570, 510 P.2d at 1034, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 482. While the charges were pending, the
insurer demanded that the insured submit to an examination under oath concerning the loss.
Id. On the advice of counsel, the insured refused to do so and the insurer denied liability for
the claim on the ground that the insured had failed to cooperate with the investigation as
required by the cooperation and notice clause in the policy. Id. at 570-71, 510 P.2d at 1035,
108 Cal. Rptr. at 483. After the criminal charges were dismissed, the insured notified the
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of the "cooperation and notice" clause 5 o was no defense to his action against
the insurer for a tortious breach of the good faith obligation. 51 The Diamon
court applied the California court's conclusion that an insurer's duty of good
faith is independent of the insured's contractual obligations 52 and decided
that a breach of contractual duties would not preclude an action on the con-
tract for breach of the obligation of good faith.
53
The Leone court began its analysis by emphasizing that, because the
case had come before it on a motion to dismiss, its decision was based solely
on the pleadings. 54  Consequently, the issue, as framed by the Third Cir-
cuit, was whether the plaintiff's complaint contained any allegations which, if
proved, would provide a legal basis for the suit to proceed 55 despite the
expiration of the contractual suit limitation period.
56
Although acknowledging that a strict reading of the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court's decision in Lardas would require dismissal of the plaintiff's
complaint, 5 7 the Third Circuit found Diamon, the more recent superior
50. A cooperation and notice clause requires an insured to submit to examination under
oath, exhibit remains of property covered by the insurance contract, and produce records to the
insurer as many times as may reasonably be required. See id. at 570-71, n.2, 510 P.2d at
1034-35 n.2, 108 Cal. Rptr. 482-83 n.2. Gruenberg's policy contained a provision that precluded
suits to recover a claim unless all requirements of the policy, including the cooperation and
notice clause, had been satisfied. Id.
51. Id. at 578, 510 P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488. The Gruenberg court held that an
implied duty of good faith exists in every insurance policy. Id. at 575, 510 P.2d at 1038, 108
Cal. Rptr. at 486. Further, the court concluded that the insurer's duty to act in good faith
cannot be excused by the failure of the insured to perform its contractual duties. Id. at 578, 510
P.2d at 1040, 108 Cal. Rptr. at 488. For a discussion of the Diamon court's application of the
Gruenberg rationale, see note 46 and accompanying text supra; notes 52-53 and accompanying
text infra.
52. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 553-54, 372 A.2d at 1228. The Diamon court recognized that if
this duty were not independent of the insured's contractual obligations, then "the insured could
circumvent its duty to act in good faith by asserting a violation by the insured of a contractual
obligation that would not have occurred but for the insurer's own action in denying the claim."
Id. at 554, 372 A.2d at 1228.
53. Id. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229. In reaching this conclusion, the Dianon court extended
the Gruenberg court's holding-which had allowed a tort action for breach of the covenant of
good faith-to negate the insurer's defense to an action on the contract itself. Id. For a discus-
sion of Diamon, see notes 42-47, 57-67 & 72-89 and accompanying text supra.
54. 599 F.2d at 567. See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
55. 599 F.2d at 567. In analyzing this question, the court focused on that portion of plain-
tiff's complaint which alleged that
[oln or about October 12, 1976, Defendant, by its duly authorized agent, did advise
Plaintiff and Plaintiff's agent that Defendant was continuing to investigate the cause of
said loss, because Defendant had reason to believe that the loss incurred was caused by
the wilfull [sic] act of Plaintiff, which allegation Plaintiff then and there denied, but which
Defendant continued thereafter to allege, despite continued denial by Plaintiff.
Id. at 568.
The court noted that on a motion to dismiss, "a complaint should not be dismissed for
failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts
in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Id. at 567, quoting Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957).
56. 599 F.2d at 567.
57. Id. at 568. The district court had relied on Lardas in granting Aetna's motion to dismiss.
448 F. Supp. at 701-02, citing Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 426 Pa. at 52, 231 A.2d at 742.
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court case, to be a more accurate expression of Pennsylvania law. 58 At the
outset, the court first found the primary holding in Diamon to be inapplica-
ble, concluding that a mere accusation of criminal conduct on the part of the
insured was insufficient to toll the suit limitation provision.5 9 Applying the
alternate holding of Diamon, however, as well as an admittedly liberal read-
ing of the plaintiff's complaint, 60 the Leone court concluded that the com-
plaint posited allegations of the defendant's bad faith which, if proved, could
provide a basis for recovery. 6 1  Consequently, the court reversed and re-
manded to allow the plaintiff an opportunity to place in issue Aetna's good
faith in asserting criminal conduct and in performing the investigation which
had engendered the criminal accusation.
62
The Lardas court held that, unless the insurer was responsible for the insured's delay, a suit
limitation clause is an absolute bar to a suit on an insurance policy. 426 Pa. at 53, 231 A.2d at
742. For a discussion of Lardas, see notes 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
58. 599 F.2d at 568. For a discussion of Diamon, see notes 42-53 and accompanying text
supra. For a discussion of the duties of a federal diversity court in applying state law and the
weight to be accorded decisions of a state intermediate appellate court, see note 42 supra; note
68 and accompanying text infra.
59. 599 F.2d at 568. For a discussion of the facts of Leone, see notes 1-10 and accompanying
text supra. For a discussion of the factual situation in Diamon found to be distinguishable by
the Leone court, see notes 43-45 and accompanying text supra. In light of the superior court's
decision in Abolin v. Farmers Am. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 100 Pa. Super. Ct. 433 (1930), that the
mere accusation of criminal conduct is insufficient to induce failure to comply with the suit
limitation provision, and considering the Diamon court's holding that an actual arrest is
adequate inducement to withhold suing on the policy, the Leone court declared: "W]e believe
that it is the law of Pennsylvania that a mere accusation of criminal conduct by an insurer
against its insured, made in good faith, and with no steps taken by the insurer toward criminal
prosecution, does not effect a tolling or suspension of the suit limitation clause." 599 F.2d at
569. Thus, the court found no grounds for applying the doctrine of estoppel. Id. For a discus-
sion of Abolin, see note 45 supra.
60. 599 F.2d at 567, 569. The Third Circuit analyzed plaintiff's complaint with a "required
broad sweep" and a "required liberal reading." Id. For a discussion of the dissent's criticism of
the majority's approach on this point, see note 67 and accompanying text infra.
61. 599 F.2d at 569. The court read the alternate holding in Diamon as postulating that an
"insurer's bad faith accusation of criminal conduct on the part of an insured, or such an allega-
tion engendered by a negligently conducted investigation would toll the suit limitation clause."
Id. It should be noted, however, that the Diamon court held only that, if an insured could
establish a breach by the insurer of the implied promise to exercise reasonable care in inves-
tigating a claim, an action on the policy would not be barred by the expiration of the suit
limitation clause. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229. For a discussion of this aspect of
Diamon, see notes 46-47 & 52-53 and accompanying text supra. For a discussion of the dissent's
contrary interpretation of Diamon, see note 67 infra.
The Leone court left open the issue of whether, if the limitation period had been tolled, an
event had occurred which might have caused the suit limitation Oeriod to begin to run again.
599 F.2d at 569. For a discussion of the means by which an insurer may revoke its waiver of a
limitation clause, see note 26 supra.
In a footnote, the Leone court discussed, without deciding, whether Diamon, like Brake-
man, required the insurer to establish actual prejudice in order to escape its contractual obliga-
tions through the insured's breach of the suit limitation clause. 599 F.2d at 569 n.4. The Leone
court distinguished Brakeman on its facts, noting that Brakeman concerned a notice of loss
provision whereas Leone involved the suit limitation provision. Id. The Leone court read
Diamon as applying the Brakeman decision to a determination of when a suit limitation clause,
once tolled, begins to run again. Id. It would seem, however, that the Diamon court would
require an insurer to demonstrate prejudice due to the insured's untimely complaint. See 247
Pa. Super. Ct. at 547-48, 372 A.2d at 1224-25; note 45 supra.
62. 599 F.2d at 569-70.
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In his dissenting opinion, Judge Hunter contended that the Diamon
"good faith" test does not represent, and is, in fact, inconsistent with,
Pennsylvania law. 63 Judge Hunter maintained that Lardas and General
State, the most recent Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases concerning suit
limitation clauses, 64 had narrowly limited suspension of a suit limitation pro-
vision to situations in which "the insurer is responsible for the insured's
failure to comply in time." 65  Judge Hunter also noted that, unlike situa-
tions in which the insurer induces the insured to withhold bringing suit, an
insured whose claim is denied will be motivated to bring suit im-
mediately. 66 Further, Judge Hunter argued that, even if the Diamon hold-
ing is an accurate statement of Pennsylvania law, the plaintiff's complaint
could not reasonably be read to suggest an issue of Aetna's bad faith.
67
In a diversity action, a federal court is "to consider all the data the
highest court of the state would use in an effort to determine how the high-
est court of the state would decide."-68  It is submitted, however, that in
63. Id. at 570-72 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
64. See id. at 570 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter noted, in an obvious reference to
Diamon, that a federal diversity court is not obligated to adopt the most recent decision of a
lower state court as state law but, rather, must determine "how the [state] Supreme Court
would decide the question .... Id., quoting National Sur. Corp. v. Midland Bank, 551 F.2d
21, 28 (3d Cir. 1977). For a further discussion of this issue, see note 68 infra.
65. 599 F.2d at 571 (Hunter, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that, as in Lardas where the
supreme court enforced the suit limitation period, the plaintiff in Leone had had approximately
five months in which to bring suit after his claim was formally denied. Id. at 572 n.5 (Hunter,
J., dissenting). For a discussion of Lardas and General State, see notes 38-41 and accompanying
text supra.
66. 599 F.2d at 572 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter stated:
The equitable underpinning which makes the Lardas/General State Authority estoppel
rule a necessary exception to the twelve month suit limitation clause is glaringly absent
with regard to the Diamon "good faith" test. If the insurer, whether or not acting in good
faith, denies an insured's claim and there is sufficient time left for the insured to comply
with the one year limit, the insured, far from being induced not to sue, will be motivated
to file suit promptly.
Id. (footnote omitted).
67. Id. at 572-73 (Hunter, J., dissenting). Judge Hunter contended that plaintiff's complaint
neither directly alleged, nor allowed an inference of, Aetna's bad faith in making the criminal
accusation or in conducting its investigation. Id. at 572 (Hunter, J., dissenting). For the perti-
nent portion of the insured's complaint, see note 55 supra.
The dissent further asserted that, in order to put into issue the insurer's good faith under
the Diamon holding, the investigation must be shown to have been recklessly, not simply negli-
gently, performed. 599 F.2d at 572 (Hunter, J., dissenting). For a critical comparison of the
views of the majority and the dissent on this issue, see notes 88-89 and accompanying text infra.
Judge Hunter also addressed the issue of whether the Brakeman decision requires the
insurer to establish prejudice before relying on the suit limitation clause but concluded that the
purpose-of a notice provision is so distinct that the supreme court would not extend Brakeman
to a suit limitation conflict. 599 F.2d at 572 n. 7 (Hunter, J., dissenting), citing Brandywine One
Hundred Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 405 F. Supp. 147 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd mem., 588
F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978). For further discussion of the possible extension of Brakeman, see notes
90-91 and accompanying text infra.
68. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (3d ed. 1976). The United States Supreme
Court has held that a federal court, sitting in a diversity action, is to apply the law as declared
by the state's legislature or its highest court. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S, 64 (1938). After
Erie, the outcome of a diversity suit in a federal court should be the same as if the action had
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giving only passing deference to the most recent Pennsylvania Supreme
Court cases, the Third Circuit has failed to apply this guideline and has
departed from current Pennsylvania law.6 9 The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has clearly expressed its reluctance to obviate the suit limitation re-
quirement absent grounds for an estoppel.7 0  The Leone court, however,
allowed the plaintiff to proceed after the expiration of the suit limitation
clause but found no grounds for imposing an estoppel. 71 Furthermore, it is
suggested that Diamon-the superior court case on which the Third Circuit
relied 72 -is,in fact, inconsistent with the supreme court cases that allow
such an action only if the insurer was responsible for the insured's failure to
sue within the specified time period.7 3 Even assuming that the plaintiff's
complaint did in fact allege bad faith conduct by the insurer, 74 neither the
Diamon nor the Leone court found that the insurer's breach of good faith
induced the insured to withhold a timely suit. 75  Although Diamon held that
proceeded in the state court. Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945). The Su-
preme Court further tightened its Erie rule when, in West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311
U.S. 223 (1940), it held that an intermediate state court's decisions may not be disregarded in
the absence of "other persuasive data that the highest court of the state would decide other-
wise." Id. at 237. Most recently, however, the Supreme Court has held that federal courts are,
at times, free to disregard the decision of intermediate state appellate courts when the state
high court has made no determination of the issue; instead, they are to apply "what they find to
be the state law after giving 'proper regard' to relevant rulings of other courts of the State."
Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (emphasis added).
69. See notes 70-89 and accompanying text infra; General State Auth. v. Planet Ins. Co.,
464 Pa. 162, 346 A.2d 265 (1975); Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 426 Pa. 47, 231 A.2d 740
(1967). For a discussion of these recent decisions in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
affirmed its unwillingness to allow an insured's action on a policy begun after the expiration of
the suit limitation period, see notes 36-41 and accompanying text supra.
70. General State Auth. v. Planet Ins. Co., 464 Pa. at 168, 346 A.2d at 268. See notes 39-41
and accompanying text supra.
71. 599 F.2d at 569. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
72. See 599 F.2d at 568-70, citing Diamon v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 247 Pa. Super. Ct.
534, 372 A.2d 1218 (1977). For a discussion of Diamon, see notes 42-53 and accompanying text
supra.
73. Compare notes 34-41 and accompanying text supra with notes 42-53 and accompanying
text supra.
74. See note 55 supra. For further discussion of whether plaintiff's complaint contained
allegations of bad faith, see notes 85-87 and accompanying text infra.
75. See notes 1-14, 42-47 & 57-62 and accompanying text supra. In determining whether
the insurer has waived the right to assert the suit limitation clause or whether the circumstances
necessitate an estoppel, the Pennsylvania courts have focused on the insurer's conduct as it
relates to the insured's failure to bring a timely action. See, e.g., General State Auth. v. Planet
Ins. Co., 464 Pa. at 168, 346 A.2d at 268; Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 426 Pa. at 52, 231
A.2d at 742; Fritz v. British Am. Assur. Co., 208 Pa. 268, 274-76, 57 A. 573, 575-76 (1904);
Sudnick v. Home Friendly Ins. Co., 149 Pa. Super. Ct. 145, 151-52, 27 A.2d 468, 471 (1942).
See also notes 23-33 & 37-38 and accompanying text supra.
In view of the Pennsylvania courts' repeated consideration of whether the insurer had ex-
pressly or impliedly indicated that the suit limitation provision would not be asserted to avoid
liability under the policy, it is submitted that any breach of good faith by the insurer, no matter
how egregious, which does not indicate that the insurer is going to forbear reliance upon the
suit limitation provision, is insufficient to toll the running of that provision. See notes 34-41 and
accompanying text supra. It should be noted that the dissent in Leone pointed out that when a
claim is denied, whether in good or bad faith, an insured "will be motivated to file suit
promptly." 599 F.2d at 572 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
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the insurer's duty to act in good faith is "independent" of the insured's con-
tractual obligations, 76 the fact remains that the supreme court has suspended
the suit limitation provision only when the insurer's conduct affected the
insured's timeliness in bringing suit.
77
Although the Third Circuit dismissed Lardas as not controlling, 78 it is
submitted that Leone is factually more similar to Lardas than to Diamon.79
In both Leone and Lardas, at least five months remained in which to bring
suit after the insurer formally denied coverage.8 0 Furthermore, the plaintiff
in Leone alleged only that the insurer had made criminal accusations,8 1
whereas, in Diamon, the insurer had actually procured the insured's ar-
rest.8 2 Lastly, unlike Diamon, in which the court noted the egregiousness
of the situation,8 3 Leone's complaint did not suggest that the insurer's inves-
tigation had been negligently performed.8 4
It is suggested that, even if Diamon represents the proper rule of law to
be applied by the federal court,8 5 the Third Circuit's admittedly liberal read-
ing of Leone's complaint conflicts with the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
efforts to narrowly limit those occasions when an insured's failure to file a
timely suit will be excused.8 6 Although the plaintiff made no assertion that
76. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229. See notes 46-47 and accompanying text
supra. The Dianon court failed, however, to distinguish the fact that that case was contractual
in nature whereas Gruenberg, upon which the Diamon court relied, was an action in tort. See
247 Pa. at 553-54, 372 A.2d at 1228; notes 48-53 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested
that, for purposes of an action on the contract, as occurred in both Diamon and Leone, the
insured should be required to demonstrate that the insurer's breach of good faith affected the
insured's ability to comply with the suit limitation clause. This resolution is at least suggested
by Diamon in that the court there expressed concern that "the insurer could circumvent its
duty to act in good faith by asserting a violation by the insured of a contractual obligation that
would not have occurred but for the insurer's own action in denying the claim." 247 Pa. Super.
Ct. at 554, 372 A.2d at 1228.
77. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra; note 75 supra. Arguably, the Diamon
court's primary holding-i.e., that the insurer's active role in bringing criminal charges against
the insured tolled the limitation clause-is not inconsistent with the state supreme court's re-
quirement that the insurer have been responsible for the delay. See notes 43-45 and accompany-
ing text supra. Had no such action been taken, the insured would presumably not have been
forced to "wait out" the criminal statute of limitations period for fear of retaliation. See note 45
supra. In any event, the Leone court found this aspect of Diamon to be inapplicable, concluding
that mere accusation of criminal activity, as occurred in Leone, is insufficient to toll the suit
limitation provision. See note 59 and accompanying text supra.
78. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
79. For the facts of Leone, Lardas and Diamon, see notes 1-10, 37-38 & 43-45 and accom-
panying text supra.
80. See notes 8 & 38 supra.
81. See note 55 supra.
82. See note 44 and accompanying text supra.
83. See notes 45-47 and accompanying text supra.
84. See note 55 supra.
85. See notes 68-77 and accompanying text supra.
86. See, e.g., General State Auth. v. Planet Ins. Co., 464 Pa. at 167-68, 346 A.2d at 268;
Lardas v. Underwriters Ins. Co., 426 Pa. at 52, 231 A.2d at 742; notes 34-36, 39-41 & 70 and
accompanying text supra. Because the suit limitation clause is mandated by statute, it can be
inferred that the legislative preference is to encourage the timeliness of suits. See note 4 supra.
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the insurer had acted in bad faith, the Leone court appeared to make a
special effort to find grounds to save plaintiff's suit. 8 7 On the other hand,
assuming Diamon applies, it would appear that the Leone majority correctly
understood that negligence in carrying out an investigation is sufficient indi-
cia of bad faith to toll the limitation clause,88 and that the dissent's argument
that the plaintiff was required to show recklessness on the part of the insurer
in order to prove bad faith would invoke a standard considerably stricter
than that dictated by Pennsylvania law.89
In order to avoid the analytical problems engendered by its reliance on
Diamon, it is submitted that the Third Circuit might, instead, have extended
the Brakeman court's prejudice requirement to suit limitation provisions to
achieve the same result of remanding for a fuller development of the
facts.90 Although leading to an expansion of circumstances in which an un-
timely suit will be allowed, it would appear that barring an untimely suit
only when the delay prejudices the insurer is more consistent with the law
as stated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court than is the Leone court's read-
ing of Diamon.s '
87. 599 F.2d at 569. In light of the Third Circuit's failure to explain how, considering the
substance of the complaint, it concluded that plaintiff's complaint contained allegations of bad
faith, it would appear that an issue of the insurer's good faith may be raised in an action on the
policy whenever the insurer has denied a claim on the ground that it suspects the insured of
complicity in the loss.
88. See 599 F.2d at 569; note 61 supra. The Diamon court concluded that the insured's
action would not be barred by the expiration of the contractual suit limitation period if, on
remand, the insured were to establish that the insurer "did not exercise reasonable care in
investigating their claim." 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229 (emphasis added). See
also note 47 and accompanying text supra. Furthermore, despite the fact that recklessness could
probably have been found in light of the egregiousness of the situation, the Diamon court did
not insist that "reckless" conduct be shown. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 555, 372 A.2d at 1229.
89. See 599 F.2d at 572 (Hunter, J., dissenting); note 67 supra.
90. See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra. Precedent for requiring the insurer to
demonstrate prejudice when defending against liability on grounds of the insured's breach of
either the notice clause or the suit limitation provision may be found in Diamon. See 247 Pa.
Super. Ct. at 547-48, 372 A.2d at 1224-25; note 45 supra. The Leone court, however, asserted
that Diamon did not hold that the insurer must establish prejudice, but only that prejudice is a
factor to be considered in determining if a suspended suit limitation period has begun to run
again. Compare note 45 supra with note 61 supra. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit concluded
that the issue of whether prejudice must be demonstrated was not properly before it. 599 F.2d
at 569 n.4.
91. The similarities between Leone and Brakeman would appear to support this argument.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Brakeman was concerned that a forfeiture of the insured's
policy rights would result if strict compliance with all policy provisions were required of the
insured. See notes 32-33 and accompanying text supra. Similarly, in Leone, dismissal because of
the expiration of the suit limitation clause would work a forfeiture of the insured's rights. See
notes 11-12 & 55-56 and accompanying text supra. Further, the Brakeman court asserted that,
since the purpose of a notice requirement is to prevent prejudice to the insurer, requiring the
insurer to establish prejudice in order to rely upon the limitation clause would not be unjust.
See notes 30-33 and accompanying text supra. Because suit limitation provisions similarly inure
to the insurer's benefit, requiring the insurer to demonstrate prejudice due to an untimely
action appears to be consistent with the Brakeman court's holding. For a discussion of the
purposes and legality of suit limitation clauses, see notes 15-21 and accompanying text supra.
For a discussion of the reluctance of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to work a forfeiture due
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The court's holding in Leone creates a decided disadvantage for insurers
defending a policy action in the Third Circuit where Pennsylvania law is to
be applied. Since it is arguable that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would
apply more stringent requirements in similar situations, 92 insureds who can
meet the jurisdictional requirements will be induced to bring their untimely
claims in federal court.9 3  Further, the court's practice of reading the com-
plaint so liberally as to suggest the insured's defense to a timeliness chal-
lenge 9 4 may cause the insurer's good faith to be called into issue whenever
the plaintiff's complaint alleges that the insurer denied the claim because it
suspected the insured of culpable activity; consequently, defense of claims
which were denied because the insured was suspected of being responsible
for the loss will become much more difficult.9 5 Finally, while the Diamon
court appeared to limit its holding to those breaches of good faith by the
insurer which are responsible for the insured's breach of a contractual
duty,9 6 because of that court's determination that the duty of good faith is
to the insured's failure to comply with his contractual obligations, see notes 32-33 and accom-
panying text supra.
At least one court has concluded that the prejudice requirement should not be extended to
the suit limitation context. See Brandywine One Hundred Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 405
F. Supp. 147 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd iner, 588 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978). In Brandywine, the
district court noted that the purpose of a notice requirement in an insurance policy is "the
avoidance of prejudice to an insurer in handling a claim due to lapse of time." 405 F. Supp. at
151. In contrast, "the purpose of a policy limitation on suit is not to avoid prejudice to an
insurer in opening the handling process [but] so that the files may be closed at a definite date,
uncertainty as to the amount of an insurer's liability avoided, and stale claims cutoff. Id. Thus,
the Brandywine court concluded that "prejudice from delay in filing suit is not a 'paramount'
concern." Id. The dissent in Leone approved of the reasoning of the Brandwyine court. See 599
F.2d at 573 n.7 (Hunter, J., dissenting).
92. See notes 69-77 and accompanying text supra. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
stated that an insured's failure to comply with suit limitation clause will be excused only in
narrowly limited situations. See notes 35-41 and accompanying text supra. It is submitted that
the Diamon rationale, allowing an insured's allegation that an insurer breached its duty of good
faith to suspend the suit limitation clause, will not be accepted by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court in light of its recent restrictive holdings. See id.
93. Such a result would, it is submitted, be in clear contravention of the Supreme Court's
prohibition against "forum shopping" as announced in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938). See note 68 supra.
94. See notes 60-61 & 86-87 and accompanying text supra.
95. This result would clearly defeat the purposes behind suit limitation provisions. See notes
15-17 and accompanying text supra. It is suggested that the main thrust of such a provision-
protection of the insurer's interest in bringing all submitted claims to a final resolution through
either settlement or abandonment-will be undermined if, in reliance upon Leone, a dilatory
policyholder can bring an untimely action by raising allegations of the insurer's bad faith, espe-
cially where the policyholder does not contend that such bad faith was in any way responsible
for his failure to comply with the suit limitation clause.
Furthermore, despite its sweeping language, it is submitted that the Dianon court did not
hold that any breach of the duty of good faith would excuse an insured's failure to comply with
a policy obligation; rather, the court appeared to limit its inquiry to whether the breach of good
faith was, in fact, responsible for the insured's lack of timeliness. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 554,
372 A.2d at 1226. See note 47 supra; notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
96. See notes 47 & 95 supra; notes 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
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"independent" and "unconditional," 9 7 an insurer who in any way breaches
the duty to act in good faith may find that it can no longer claim the protec-
tion of the contract provisions. 98 As a result, insurers will be prompted to
make extensive investigations of even minor claims to protect themselves
from such charges of bad faith. 99
In conclusion, by imposing the requirement that the insurer must not
have breached its duty of good faith in order to rely on the suit limitation
provision, 100 the Third Circuit has carved out a new exception under which
an insured can proceed with an untimely suit. 10 ' Moreover, the Third Cir-
cuit has liberally extended the requirement of good faith to excuse a
policyholder's noncompliance with a standard contract provision 102 without
requiring a showing that the insurer's acts affect the insured's ability to com-
ply with the obligations he has undertaken.
Kathleen Seybold Turezyn
97. 247 Pa. Super. Ct. at 553, 372 A.2d at 1228. See note 46 supra.
98. It is unclear whether the Third Circuit would extend the Diamon holding so broadly,
but the Leone court's failure to discuss the effect of the insurer's breach of good faith on the
insured's ability to bring suit suggests that it did not consider the connection relevant. For a
discussion of the Third Circuit's holding, see notes 54-62 and accompanying text supra.
99. Because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has never held a breach of good faith by the
insurer to be a sufficient reason to toll the suit limitation clause, it is unclear exactly what facts
the insurer will be required to demonstrate in order to show that reasonable care was exercised
in conducting the investigation. See notes 76-77 and accompanying text supra. Until sufficient
guidelines are set forth as to what constitutes a "good faith" investigation, it is suggested that
insurers will be likely to err on the side of caution, conducting more extensive, and more
expensive, investigations.
100. See text accompanying note 14 supra.
101. For a discussion of devices previously employed by Pennsylvania courts to allow an
insured to proceed with his untimely suit, see notes 24-29 and accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 3-4 and accompanying text supra.
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